The gtk-vnc package is used by the vnc-display-test qtest
program. Technically only gvnc is needed, but since we
already pull in the gtk3 dep, it is harmless to depend
on gtk-vnc.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240718094159.902024-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Since quite a while MSYS2 now supports Clang as a compiler, too.
Unfortunately, this compiler is lacking the __attribute__((gcc_struct))
that we need for compiling on Windows. But since the compiler is
available now, some people started to use it to compile QEMU on MSYS2,
apparently ignoring the compiler warnings (see for example the ticket at
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2476 ). These builds are
likely broken in a couple of spots, so let's make sure that we rather
bail out early in the configuration phase instead of allowing the build
to succeed with warnings.
Message-ID: <20240815122719.727639-1-thuth@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
* fix --static compilation of hexagon
* fix incorrect application of REX to MMX operands
* fix crash on module load
* update Italian translation
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# gpg: Signature made Wed 14 Aug 2024 03:02:22 AM AEST
# gpg: using RSA key F13338574B662389866C7682BFFBD25F78C7AE83
# gpg: issuer "pbonzini@redhat.com"
# gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>" [full]
# gpg: aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>" [full]
* tag 'for-upstream' of https://gitlab.com/bonzini/qemu:
po: update Italian translation
module: Prevent crash by resetting local_err in module_load_qom_all()
target/i386: Assert MMX and XMM registers in range
target/i386: Use unit not type in decode_modrm
target/i386: Do not apply REX to MMX operands
target/hexagon: don't look for static glib
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Our current usage of MMU indexes when EL3 is AArch32 is confused.
Architecturally, when EL3 is AArch32, all Secure code runs under the
Secure PL1&0 translation regime:
* code at EL3, which might be Mon, or SVC, or any of the
other privileged modes (PL1)
* code at EL0 (Secure PL0)
This is different from when EL3 is AArch64, in which case EL3 is its
own translation regime, and EL1 and EL0 (whether AArch32 or AArch64)
have their own regime.
We claimed to be mapping Secure PL1 to our ARMMMUIdx_EL3, but didn't
do anything special about Secure PL0, which meant it used the same
ARMMMUIdx_EL10_0 that NonSecure PL0 does. This resulted in a bug
where arm_sctlr() incorrectly picked the NonSecure SCTLR as the
controlling register when in Secure PL0, which meant we were
spuriously generating alignment faults because we were looking at the
wrong SCTLR control bits.
The use of ARMMMUIdx_EL3 for Secure PL1 also resulted in the bug that
we wouldn't honour the PAN bit for Secure PL1, because there's no
equivalent _PAN mmu index for it.
We could fix this in one of two ways:
* The most straightforward is to add new MMU indexes EL30_0,
EL30_3, EL30_3_PAN to correspond to "Secure PL1&0 at PL0",
"Secure PL1&0 at PL1", and "Secure PL1&0 at PL1 with PAN".
This matches how we use indexes for the AArch64 regimes, and
preserves propirties like being able to determine the privilege
level from an MMU index without any other information. However
it would add two MMU indexes (we can share one with ARMMMUIdx_EL3),
and we are already using 14 of the 16 the core TLB code permits.
* The more complicated approach is the one we take here. We use
the same MMU indexes (E10_0, E10_1, E10_1_PAN) for Secure PL1&0
than we do for NonSecure PL1&0. This saves on MMU indexes, but
means we need to check in some places whether we're in the
Secure PL1&0 regime or not before we interpret an MMU index.
The changes in this commit were created by auditing all the places
where we use specific ARMMMUIdx_ values, and checking whether they
needed to be changed to handle the new index value usage.
Note for potential stable backports: taking also the previous
(comment-change-only) commit might make the backport easier.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2326
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Bernhard Beschow <shentey@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240809160430.1144805-3-peter.maydell@linaro.org
We have a long comment describing the Arm architectural translation
regimes and how we map them to QEMU MMU indexes. This comment has
got a bit out of date:
* FEAT_SEL2 allows Secure EL2 and corresponding new regimes
* FEAT_RME introduces Realm state and its translation regimes
* We now model the Cortex-R52 so that is no longer a hypothetical
* We separated Secure Stage 2 and NonSecure Stage 2 MMU indexes
* We have an MMU index per physical address spacea
Add the missing pieces so that the list of architectural translation
regimes matches the Arm ARM, and the list and count of QEMU MMU
indexes in the comment matches the enum.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Bernhard Beschow <shentey@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240809160430.1144805-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org
This commit adds validation checks for the MCOPRE and MCOSEL values in
the rcc_update_cfgr_register function. If the MCOPRE value exceeds
0b100 or the MCOSEL value exceeds 0b111, an error is logged and the
corresponding clock mux is disabled. This helps in identifying and
handling invalid configurations in the RCC registers.
Reproducer:
cat << EOF | qemu-system-aarch64 -display \
none -machine accel=qtest, -m 512M -machine b-l475e-iot01a -qtest \
stdio
writeq 0x40021008 0xffffffff
EOF
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2356
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
When cross compiling QEMU configured with --static, I've been getting
configure errors like the following:
Build-time dependency glib-2.0 found: NO
../target/hexagon/meson.build:303:15: ERROR: Dependency lookup for glib-2.0 with method 'pkgconfig' failed: Could not generate libs for glib-2.0:
Package libpcre2-8 was not found in the pkg-config search path.
Perhaps you should add the directory containing `libpcre2-8.pc'
to the PKG_CONFIG_PATH environment variable
Package 'libpcre2-8', required by 'glib-2.0', not found
This happens because --static sets the prefer_static Meson option, but
my build machine doesn't have a static libpcre2. I don't think it
makes sense to insist that native dependencies are static, just
because I want the non-native QEMU binaries to be static.
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Ross <hi@alyssa.is>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240805104921.4035256-1-hi@alyssa.is
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* Fix BTI versus CF_PCREL
* include: Fix typo in name of MAKE_IDENTFIER macro
* docs: Various txt-to-rST conversions
* hw/core/ptimer: fix timer zero period condition for freq > 1GHz
* arm/virt: place power button pin number on a define
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# gpg: Signature made Mon 12 Aug 2024 10:09:48 PM AEST
# gpg: using RSA key E1A5C593CD419DE28E8315CF3C2525ED14360CDE
# gpg: issuer "peter.maydell@linaro.org"
# gpg: Good signature from "Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>" [full]
# gpg: aka "Peter Maydell <pmaydell@gmail.com>" [full]
# gpg: aka "Peter Maydell <pmaydell@chiark.greenend.org.uk>" [full]
# gpg: aka "Peter Maydell <peter@archaic.org.uk>" [unknown]
* tag 'pull-target-arm-20240812' of https://git.linaro.org/people/pmaydell/qemu-arm:
arm/virt: place power button pin number on a define
hw/core/ptimer: fix timer zero period condition for freq > 1GHz
docs: Typo fix in live disk backup
docs/interop/prl-xml.rst: Fix minor grammar nits
docs/interop/prl-xml.txt: Convert to rST
docs/interop/parallels.txt: Convert to rST
docs/interop/nbd.txt: Convert to rST
docs/specs/rocker.txt: Convert to rST
include: Fix typo in name of MAKE_IDENTFIER macro
target/arm: Fix BTI versus CF_PCREL
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
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# gpg: Signature made Mon 12 Aug 2024 05:25:13 PM AEST
# gpg: using RSA key 215D46F48246689EC77F3562EF04965B398D6211
# gpg: Good signature from "Jason Wang (Jason Wang on RedHat) <jasowang@redhat.com>" [undefined]
# gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
# gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
# Primary key fingerprint: 215D 46F4 8246 689E C77F 3562 EF04 965B 398D 6211
* tag 'net-pull-request' of https://github.com/jasowang/qemu:
net: Fix '-net nic,model=' for non-help arguments
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Add in the missing space in the section header.
Fixes: 1084159b31 ("qapi: deprecate drive-backup", v6.2.0)
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Convert the rocker.txt specification document to rST format. We make
extensive use of the :: marker to introduce a literal block for all
the tables and ASCII art, rather than trying to convert the tables to
rST table syntax. This produces a valid rST document without needing
a huge diff.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240801170131.3977807-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org
In commit bb71846325 we added some macro magic to avoid
variable-shadowing when using some of our more complicated
macros. One of the internal components of this is a macro
named MAKE_IDENTFIER. Fix the typo in its name: it should
be MAKE_IDENTIFIER.
Commit created with
sed -i -e 's/MAKE_IDENTFIER/MAKE_IDENTIFIER/g' include/qemu/*.h include/qapi/qmp/qobject.h
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240801102516.3843780-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
With pcrel, we cannot check the guarded page bit at translation
time, as different mappings of the same physical page may or may
not have the GP bit set.
Instead, add a couple of helpers to check the page at runtime,
after all other filters that might obviate the need for the check.
The set_btype_for_br call must be moved after the gen_a64_set_pc
call to ensure the current pc can still be computed.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20240802003028.795476-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
A malicious client can attempt to connect to an NBD server, and then
intentionally delay progress in the handshake, including if it does
not know the TLS secrets. Although the previous two patches reduce
this behavior by capping the default max-connections parameter and
killing slow clients, they did not eliminate the possibility of a
client waiting to close the socket until after the QMP nbd-server-stop
command is executed, at which point qemu would SEGV when trying to
dereference the NULL nbd_server global which is no longer present.
This amounts to a denial of service attack. Worse, if another NBD
server is started before the malicious client disconnects, I cannot
rule out additional adverse effects when the old client interferes
with the connection count of the new server (although the most likely
is a crash due to an assertion failure when checking
nbd_server->connections > 0).
For environments without this patch, the CVE can be mitigated by
ensuring (such as via a firewall) that only trusted clients can
connect to an NBD server. Note that using frameworks like libvirt
that ensure that TLS is used and that nbd-server-stop is not executed
while any trusted clients are still connected will only help if there
is also no possibility for an untrusted client to open a connection
but then stall on the NBD handshake.
Given the previous patches, it would be possible to guarantee that no
clients remain connected by having nbd-server-stop sleep for longer
than the default handshake deadline before finally freeing the global
nbd_server object, but that could make QMP non-responsive for a long
time. So intead, this patch fixes the problem by tracking all client
sockets opened while the server is running, and forcefully closing any
such sockets remaining without a completed handshake at the time of
nbd-server-stop, then waiting until the coroutines servicing those
sockets notice the state change. nbd-server-stop now has a second
AIO_WAIT_WHILE_UNLOCKED (the first is indirectly through the
blk_exp_close_all_type() that disconnects all clients that completed
handshakes), but forced socket shutdown is enough to progress the
coroutines and quickly tear down all clients before the server is
freed, thus finally fixing the CVE.
This patch relies heavily on the fact that nbd/server.c guarantees
that it only calls nbd_blockdev_client_closed() from the main loop
(see the assertion in nbd_client_put() and the hoops used in
nbd_client_put_nonzero() to achieve that); if we did not have that
guarantee, we would also need a mutex protecting our accesses of the
list of connections to survive re-entrancy from independent iothreads.
Although I did not actually try to test old builds, it looks like this
problem has existed since at least commit 862172f45c (v2.12.0, 2017) -
even back when that patch started using a QIONetListener to handle
listening on multiple sockets, nbd_server_free() was already unaware
that the nbd_blockdev_client_closed callback can be reached later by a
client thread that has not completed handshakes (and therefore the
client's socket never got added to the list closed in
nbd_export_close_all), despite that patch intentionally tearing down
the QIONetListener to prevent new clients.
Reported-by: Alexander Ivanov <alexander.ivanov@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: CVE-2024-7409
CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-14-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
A client that opens a socket but does not negotiate is merely hogging
qemu's resources (an open fd and a small amount of memory); and a
malicious client that can access the port where NBD is listening can
attempt a denial of service attack by intentionally opening and
abandoning lots of unfinished connections. The previous patch put a
default bound on the number of such ongoing connections, but once that
limit is hit, no more clients can connect (including legitimate ones).
The solution is to insist that clients complete handshake within a
reasonable time limit, defaulting to 10 seconds. A client that has
not successfully completed NBD_OPT_GO by then (including the case of
where the client didn't know TLS credentials to even reach the point
of NBD_OPT_GO) is wasting our time and does not deserve to stay
connected. Later patches will allow fine-tuning the limit away from
the default value (including disabling it for doing integration
testing of the handshake process itself).
Note that this patch in isolation actually makes it more likely to see
qemu SEGV after nbd-server-stop, as any client socket still connected
when the server shuts down will now be closed after 10 seconds rather
than at the client's whims. That will be addressed in the next patch.
For a demo of this patch in action:
$ qemu-nbd -f raw -r -t -e 10 file &
$ nbdsh --opt-mode -c '
H = list()
for i in range(20):
print(i)
H.insert(i, nbd.NBD())
H[i].set_opt_mode(True)
H[i].connect_uri("nbd://localhost")
'
$ kill $!
where later connections get to start progressing once earlier ones are
forcefully dropped for taking too long, rather than hanging.
Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-13-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: rebase to changes earlier in series, reduce scope of timer]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Allowing an unlimited number of clients to any web service is a recipe
for a rudimentary denial of service attack: the client merely needs to
open lots of sockets without closing them, until qemu no longer has
any more fds available to allocate.
For qemu-nbd, we default to allowing only 1 connection unless more are
explicitly asked for (-e or --shared); this was historically picked as
a nice default (without an explicit -t, a non-persistent qemu-nbd goes
away after a client disconnects, without needing any additional
follow-up commands), and we are not going to change that interface now
(besides, someday we want to point people towards qemu-storage-daemon
instead of qemu-nbd).
But for qemu proper, and the newer qemu-storage-daemon, the QMP
nbd-server-start command has historically had a default of unlimited
number of connections, in part because unlike qemu-nbd it is
inherently persistent until nbd-server-stop. Allowing multiple client
sockets is particularly useful for clients that can take advantage of
MULTI_CONN (creating parallel sockets to increase throughput),
although known clients that do so (such as libnbd's nbdcopy) typically
use only 8 or 16 connections (the benefits of scaling diminish once
more sockets are competing for kernel attention). Picking a number
large enough for typical use cases, but not unlimited, makes it
slightly harder for a malicious client to perform a denial of service
merely by opening lots of connections withot progressing through the
handshake.
This change does not eliminate CVE-2024-7409 on its own, but reduces
the chance for fd exhaustion or unlimited memory usage as an attack
surface. On the other hand, by itself, it makes it more obvious that
with a finite limit, we have the problem of an unauthenticated client
holding 100 fds opened as a way to block out a legitimate client from
being able to connect; thus, later patches will further add timeouts
to reject clients that are not making progress.
This is an INTENTIONAL change in behavior, and will break any client
of nbd-server-start that was not passing an explicit max-connections
parameter, yet expects more than 100 simultaneous connections. We are
not aware of any such client (as stated above, most clients aware of
MULTI_CONN get by just fine on 8 or 16 connections, and probably cope
with later connections failing by relying on the earlier connections;
libvirt has not yet been passing max-connections, but generally
creates NBD servers with the intent for a single client for the sake
of live storage migration; meanwhile, the KubeSAN project anticipates
a large cluster sharing multiple clients [up to 8 per node, and up to
100 nodes in a cluster], but it currently uses qemu-nbd with an
explicit --shared=0 rather than qemu-storage-daemon with
nbd-server-start).
We considered using a deprecation period (declare that omitting
max-parameters is deprecated, and make it mandatory in 3 releases -
then we don't need to pick an arbitrary default); that has zero risk
of breaking any apps that accidentally depended on more than 100
connections, and where such breakage might not be noticed under unit
testing but only under the larger loads of production usage. But it
does not close the denial-of-service hole until far into the future,
and requires all apps to change to add the parameter even if 100 was
good enough. It also has a drawback that any app (like libvirt) that
is accidentally relying on an unlimited default should seriously
consider their own CVE now, at which point they are going to change to
pass explicit max-connections sooner than waiting for 3 qemu releases.
Finally, if our changed default breaks an app, that app can always
pass in an explicit max-parameters with a larger value.
It is also intentional that the HMP interface to nbd-server-start is
not changed to expose max-connections (any client needing to fine-tune
things should be using QMP).
Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-12-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[ericb: Expand commit message to summarize Dan's argument for why we
break corner-case back-compat behavior without a deprecation period]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Upcoming patches to fix a CVE need to track an opaque pointer passed
in by the owner of a client object, as well as request for a time
limit on how fast negotiation must complete. Prepare for that by
changing the signature of nbd_client_new() and adding an accessor to
get at the opaque pointer, although for now the two servers
(qemu-nbd.c and blockdev-nbd.c) do not change behavior even though
they pass in a new default timeout value.
Suggested-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240807174943.771624-11-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[eblake: s/LIMIT/MAX_SECS/ as suggested by Dan]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Define a hexagon_cpu_properties list to match the idiom used
by other targets.
Signed-off-by: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Simpson <ltaylorsimpson@gmail.com>
Add my git tree for hexagon. Note that the branch is "hex-next" and not
"hex.next" as had been used previously. But I'll keep the "hex.next" branch
in sync with "hex-next" until this commit lands to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Brian Cain <bcain@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé